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ABSTRACT 
Border disputes cause strife worldwide, especially in underdeveloped countries. In 
Africa, border disputes are commonplace, and they produce bitter conflicts and 
tribulations. 
This thesis investigates the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over 
Lake Nyasa. It argues that the protracted dispute is the result of inaction and poor 
leadership, rather than ‘colonial legacy.’ Using game theory, this thesis demonstrates that 
partial sum games produce the best path for resolving this border dispute through 
communication and cooperation. Furthermore, the thesis argues that the establishment of 
democracy and rule of law, responsible leadership, and strong political will should create 
the conditions for successful compromise between the two countries. Without a 
negotiated settlement, Malawi and Tanzania’s border dispute will continue to affect 
relations between the two countries and deplete natural resources in and around the lake. 
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Since 1964, Malawi and Tanzania have been in a border dispute over Lake Nyasa. 
This conflict poses a threat to peace between the two countries. In Addition, the border 
dispute creates instability, slows the already inadequate socio-political and economic 
developments of both countries, and prevents policy paradigms for sustainable 
development in the region.   
According to political scientist Jorge Dominguez, statistical studies illustrate that, 
“Territorial border disputes increased the probability of war and have higher probability 
of leading states to war than other kinds of disputes.”1 Mandel asserts that boundary 
disagreements, which escalate to war, generally involve two neighboring countries that 
are underdeveloped. These warring factions usually have parity in military strength, 
belong to different alliances, and have ethnic, tribal or clannish differences.2 Nindi, 
Gledinisch, and Guo claim resource scarcity generates hostility between neighboring 
nations more than any other causes.3 In essence, rivalry over limited resource, coupled 
with a population explosion, could escalate a border dispute into an armed conflict. The 
trio argues that the situation calls for the pragmatic management of resources in areas 
with border disputes. 
                                                 
1 Jorge I. Dominguez, et al., “Boundary Disputes in Latin America,” United States Institute of Peace,  
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/pwks50.pdf (accessed June 14, 2010). 
2 Robert Mandel, “Roots of the Modern Interstate Border Dispute,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September, 1980): 427 – 454, http://www.jstor.org/stable/173640?seq=1 
(accessed June 18, 2010). 
3 Stephen J. Nindi, “Changing Livelihoods and Environment Along Lake Nyasa, Tanzania,” African 
Study Monographs, Suppl, 36, (March, 2007): 71 – 93, http://www.africa.kyoto-u.ac.jp 
/kiroku/asm_suppl/abstracts/pdf/ASM_s36/5ASM_Nindi2.pdf (accessed June 30, 2010); Nils Petter 
Gledinisch et al, “Conflict Over Shared Rivers: Resource Scarcity of Fuzzy Boundaries?” Political 
Geography, Elsevier Ltd, 25 (2006): 361 – 382, http://www.elsevier.com/locate/polgeo (accessed July 7, 
2010); Rongxing Guo, “Cross Border Resource Management–Theory and Practice (The Final Report East 
Asian Development Network (EADN)) 2004,” http://www.eadn.org/report/upweb/wp28.pdf (accessed July 
7, 2010). 
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Both Shah4 and Anyu5 argue that the effects of colonialism, specifically the 
creation of Africa’s state borders, have created prolonged border disputes. Furthermore, 
in a 2007 study, Anyu claims that a majority of the 103 ethnic and interstate conflicts in 
Africa were the result of artificial boundaries drawn by colonial powers during the 
scramble for Africa in the mid 1880s. Prescott and Triggs confirm that interstate 
boundaries in Africa are the prominent raison d'être for conflicts in the region because 
their delimitation lacked important information about Africa’s inhabitants and 
geographical data.6 
Literature abounds regarding the basis of interstate border conflicts; however, 
there is meager, if any, literature that discusses explicitly the significance of a country’s 
leadership in resolving such clashes. Wilson mentions that in ancient Greece, the 
Aetolian state’s boundaries varied according to the disposition and tempo of the state’s 
leadership. Consequently, Aetolia experienced confrontations with sister Greek states, 
and her reputation was compromised.7 Domininguez argues that some countries might 
boast of “political will” to solve such conflicts but, frequently, conflict-ridden countries 
do not have the necessary political will to find a resolution.8 This challenge begs an 
important question about leadership, what aptitude is required to make plausible 
decisions to mitigate or resolve border conflicts?  
B. SCOPE AND PURPOSE 
This thesis intends to look at the role of leadership in Africa; specifically its 
political will and prudence in resolving border conflicts. It will examine interstate border 
conflicts in Africa through the Malawi—Tanzania case. The problem of border disputes 
                                                 
4 Anup Shah, “Conflicts in Africa-Introduction,” http://www.globalissues.org/article/84/conflicts-in-
africa-introduction (accessed June 18, 2010).  
5 J. Ndumbe Anyu, “International Court of Justice and Border-Conflict Resolution in Africa: The 
Bakassi Peninsular Conflict,” Mediterranean Quarterly, Volume 18, Number 3, (Summer 2007): 39–55. 
6 Robert Victor Prescott and William Doreen Triggs, International Frontiers and Boundaries: Laws, 
Politics and Geography, (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2008), 91–96, http://books.google. Com books? 
id=r4fJXX (accessed July 9, 2010). 
7 Nigel Guy Wilson, Encyclopedia of Ancient Greece, (New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis 
Group, 2006), 22, http://books.google.com/books?id=-aFtPdh6 -2QC  (accessed June 26, 2010). 
8 Dominguez, “Boundary Disputes in Latin America.” 
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in Africa is not unique to Malawi and Tanzania. Indeed, 48 of the 54 African countries9 
are involved in border disputes that range from long-established mutual variance to 
mottled one-sided charges.10 Only six nations are not involved in these conflicts, and 
some countries are involved in more than one. These clashes vary in strength from 
quiescent to active. Again, there is a correlation between these issues and other conflicts 
ongoing in Africa. As border disputes are often the underlying cause of other conflicts. 
The principal argument here is that human factors influence border disputes. 
Especially influential is the role of leadership in determining plausible alternatives to the 
status quo. There is a need to utilize the contiguous geographical and cultural space 
between states to break the hostile vicious circle of conflicts generated by contested 
frontiers. In particular, this thesis will use the Malawi—Tanzania border dispute to 
expound on the wider threat posed by border conflicts. It will argue that, pro-active 
administrations can initiate peaceful negotiations and resolve these disputes in Africa and 
beyond. Additionally, leaders should devise means to control the diminishing natural 
recourses in the Lake Nyasa area and develop the region cooperatively. Stability and 
security are a prerequisite for growth; therefore, a peaceful environment will provide a 
proper setting for sustainable economic development. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In light of the factors influencing the interstate border conflict between Malawi 
and Tanzania, this thesis will look at the role of leadership and political will as possible 
means of de-escalating the dispute. The questions to be investigated are as follows:  1. What role has leadership played in either contributing to or mitigating the 
Malawi—Tanzania border dispute? 2. More specifically:  
a) Is the boundary dispute primarily a colonial inheritance or something 
else? 
                                                 
9 “The Africa Guide,” African Countries, http://www.africaguide.com/country.htm (accessed July 25, 
2010). 
10 “International Disputes,” CIA, The World Factbook – Field Listing, https://www.cia.gov/ library/ 
publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2070.html (accessed June 26, 2010). 
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b) Resources scarcity along Lake Nyasa is escalating the conflict. What 
joint strategies are in place to ensure stability? What policies should be 
in place to mitigate the conflict?  
c) Is political will and leadership sufficient to resolve the existing 
boundary dispute between Malawi and Tanzania? If not, what else 
should be done? 
D. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
Border disputes in Africa are among the most basic sources of bitter struggle in 
the region. They cause relentless strife, including refugee problems, environmental 
degradation, deforestation, small arms proliferation, organized crime, and other regional 
instabilities. Border disputes are very volatile; the contiguous countries’ populations are 
increasing rapidly, while resources are dwindling, which creates hotbeds of conflict in the 
milieu. The Malawi–Tanzania border case is linked to the spurious demarcation of the 
border around Lake Nyasa, which was created by the Anglo-Germany Treaty of July 1, 
1890:  
To the south by the line that starts on the coast of the northern border of 
Mozambique Province and follows the course of the Rovuma River to the 
point where the Messinge flows into the Rovuma. From here the line runs 
westward on the parallel of latitude to the shore of Lake Nyasa. Turning 
north, it continues along the eastern, northern, and western shores of the 
lake until it reaches the northern bank of the mouth of the Songwe 
River.11 
Tanzania recognizes the potential threat of the border described above, and they 
have officially requested that their Malawian counterparts share the lake’s resources. In  
addition, Tanzania proposed that the official boundary between the countries should 
follow the median line in Lake Nyasa. Malawi President Kamuzu Banda did not respond 
favorably to these requests:  
                                                 
11 “Wilhelmine Germany and the First World War, 1890-1918, Anglo-German Treaty [Heligoland-
Zanzibar Treaty] (July 1, 1890),” Germany History in Documents and Images, Volume 5, http:// 
germanhistorydocs.ghi-dc.org/pdf/eng/606_Anglo-German%20Treaty_110.pdf (accessed June 21, 2010). 
 5 
We will never recognize or accept this claim: we will never agree to the 
suggestion or proposal. The Lake has always belonged to 
Malawi….Everyone knew Nyerere as a coward and communist inspired 
jellyfish: We know while pretending to be a staunch supporter of the 
OAU, Nyerere is the worst agitator and betrayer of the cause for which the 
Organization was formulated. History, geography or even ethnical 
knowledge will convince Nyerere that four districts to the South of 
Tanganyika belong to us by nature. It is only that we respect the feasible 
unification of Mother Africa that we do not claim these districts. All that 
we are doing is setting [sic] historical truth.12   
More recently, the Tanzanian Government set up a commission to work together 
with Malawi and draw salient recommendations to solve the border dispute. The 
Tanzanian Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda said, “Negotiations have been underway 
between Tanzania and Malawi to reach consensus on the boundary conflict. However, he 
admitted there has been a long standing tug of war in agreeing on where the correct 
boundary is located.”13 As a result of the different priorities and divergent policies of the 
two countries, the dispute has dragged on for a long time. 
In view of the impending predicament, the dispute reflects lack of a resolute and 
sincere desire from the leadership to solve its own problems, and it is not a problem 
inherited from colonialism. Specifically, this thesis hypothesizes that: 
1. The border dilemma coupled with poor leadership and a lack of political 
will, might lead to interstate conflict between Malawi and Tanzania. 
2. The unresolved boundary treaty (referred to as colonial legacy) is an 
excuse for inaction between the two countries. 
3. Resource depletion along Lake Nyasa will intensify the chances of clashes 
between the two nations. 
4. Reduced conflicts will create an atmosphere that is conducive for 
enhanced bilateral cooperation and mutual development between the two 
states.  
                                                 
12 James Mayall, “The Malawi -Tanzania Boundary Dispute,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 
Volume 11, Issue No. 4, (December 1973): 611–628. 
13 Faraja Jube, “Tanzania: Discussions to Solve Malawi Border Conflict Soon,” The Citizen (Dar es 
Salaam), February 4, 2010, http://allafrica.com/stories/201002050139.htm (accessed June 19, 2010). 
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This thesis will also examine international laws governing inland waterways and 
lakes and the possibility of a peaceful de-escalation of the problem by pursuing of a 
plausible solution through arbitration.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will employ two methods to investigate possible solutions to the 
border dispute between Tanzania and Malawi over Lake Nyasa. First, it will offer a 
historical analysis of the region, highlighting the conditions that led to the border dispute 
between the two countries. The thesis will also draw from political science literature that 
looks at the role of democracy and international arbitration in resolving conflicts trough 
negotiations, rather than armed conflicts. 
Second, this thesis will employ mathematical tools, specifically game theory, to 
demonstrate the importance of cooperation in conflict resolution.  It will look at 
cooperation, which permits communications and results in mutual gains for each 
opponent through partial sum games. It will also show the poor payoffs achieved from 
selfish strategic moves, specifically through the absence of communication between 
Tanzania and Malawi. Improved payoffs, in turn, are realized by better communication.  
Finally, win-win achievements are recognized at the Nash equilibrium of both countries. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II begins by reviewing the literature on border conflicts and investigating 
the extent of the problem both globally and in Africa. The chapter then looks at the 
history of the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania over Lake Nyasa. It proposes 
that the role played by democracy, specifically governance to mitigate border problems, 
is a potential solution to the conflict. Explicitly, it addresses the invaluable contribution 
of leadership and political will. Chapter III uses game theory to explore conflict 
resolution, underpinning the importance of cooperation in nations’ efforts to resolve 
conflicts. In particular, teamwork can promote progress amidst rivals once the will to 
mutually gain from an antagonistic situation is engendered. Chapter IV recaps issues 
echoed in the thesis and suggests ways to resolve the Malawi-Tanzania border dispute.  
 7 
II. CONCEPTUALIZING BORDER CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
You take my life when you take the means whereby I live. 
—William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Nations go to war for several reasons, among them disputes over interstate 
boundaries and associated competition over resources along frontiers. The basis of the 
conflict between Malawi and Tanzania is Malawi’s claim to the waters of a lake whose 
very name they dispute. Malawi calls it “Lake Malawi” as opposed to the more 
traditional name of “Lake Nyasa.”14 Many ethnic groups, among them the Yao, 
Mang’anya, Konde, Matengo, Tonga and Nyakyusa reside harmoniously along the shores 
of Niassa/Nyassa, which means “any large body of water.”15 The tribes’ livelihood 
depends mainly on the resources from the Lake and the surrounding countryside. Prior to 
the demarcation of Africa, the people coexisted peacefully and permitted free migration 
and trade in the general area; in fact they are kinfolk. 
The arbitrary creation of the African boundaries determined in Berlin from 1884 
to 1885,16 forced families to reside in two neighboring states. Some lived in the Germany 
colony of Tanganyika and others in Nyasaland, ruled by the United Kingdom.  At the 
time of independence for both countries, Tanganyika in 1961, which later become the 
                                                 
14 David Livingstone named the lake after being informed by the Yao tribe (who live in both 
countries) that in chiYao, “nyasa,” means “lake,” see: Peter Godwin, When a Crocodile Eats the Sun: A 
Memoir of Africa (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2008), 153. See also: “Lake Nyasa Facts, 
information, pictures,” The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition, 2008, Encyclopedia.com, http://www. 
encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-Nyasa-la.html (accessed July 8, 2010). 
15 Nindi, “Changing Livelihoods and the Environment Along Lake Nyasa, Tanzania,” 71-93; “Lake 
Nyasa: Definition,” Answers.Com, http://www.answers.com/topic/lake-malawi (accessed July 6, 2010). 
16 “The Partition of Africa|The Black Past: Remembered and Reclaimed,” BlackPast.org, 
http://www.blackpast.com/?q=gah/partition-africa (accessed June 15, 2010). 
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United Republic of Tanzania in 1964, and Malawi inherited the counterfeit boundary.17 
The Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, which sealed the fate of the two states, is the basis 
for the conflict.18 Britain and Germany made some administrative amendments along the 
Malawi—Tanzania border before 1914, and both realms shared the lake prior to the First 
World War (WWI). Colonial powers deployed gunboats in Lake Nyasa before the war. 
On August 13, 1914, the British gunboat Guendolen destroyed the German gunboat 
Hermann Von Wissmann at Sphinxhaven in Lake Nyasa.19 For no apparent reason, the 
British colonial administration placed the lake’s entire water surface under the authority 
of the territory of Nyasaland. This is the origin of the post WWI disagreement. The 
consequent border skirmishes subsided after Malawi failed to impose its claim. However, 
in the 1990’s Tanzanians residing along the shores of Lake Nyasa were occasionally 
accused of fishing in Malawian waters, which prompted outcries from the Malawian 
Government.20  
A recent study on the East African region by political scientist F. Wafula Okumu 
has brought to the forefront both the growing frontier disputes over resources and the fast 
population growth in the area. Okumu describes chronological and modern reasons that 
impact the problem, arguing that, “...each of the countries in Eastern Africa has had at 
least one border dispute with a neighbor, mainly over territorial claims, mostly over lack 
of clearly defined and marked boundaries, the availability of trans-boundary resources, 
and security-related matters.”21 Furthermore, he asserts that Belgium, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy, and Portugal drew the East African boundaries to further their strategic 
                                                 
17 “International Boundary Study, No. 37 - October 26, 1964, Malawi – Tanzania (Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar) Boundary,’ (Country Codes: MI – TZ), Department of State: United States of America, 
http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/collection/ LimitsinSeas/IBS037.pdf (accessed June 15, 2010). 
18 “Wilhelmine Germany and the First World War, 1890-1918, Anglo-German Treaty [Heligoland-
Zanzibar Treaty] (July 1, 1890),” Germany History in Documents and Images, Volume 5. 
19 The Guendolen vs. Hermann Von Wissmann, http://www.clash-of-steel.org/pages/battle 
datails.php?battle=GUENDOLENVO1 (accessed July 6, 2010). 
20 “Information and Data About Marketing, Finance, Business, Healthcare, and Classifieds Reach 
Information,” Lake Malawi, http://www.reachinformation.com/define/Lake%20Malawi.aspx  (accessed 
July 6, 2010). 
21 “Colonial Errors Border Disputes in East African Region,” Diplomat East Africa, 
http://diplomateast africa.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=360:colonial-errors-
border-disputes-in-ea-region&catid=1:dna&Itemid=66 (accessed January 13, 2011).  
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colonial interests. Ironically, about a century ago, rival colonial powers, Britain and 
Germany, shared the lake. Today, two independent states are failing to do the same.  
Germany lost its colony in East Africa after its defeat in the WWI. The United 
Kingdom (UK) held on to Malawi and, at the same time, the League of Nations Mandate, 
entrusted Britain with the management of Tanganyika Territory, the former German East 
Africa colony. Britain could have solved the border dispute between Malawi and 
Tanzania like it did the dispute between Malawi and Mozambique; however, Britain did 
not pay suitable attention to the issue on the Tanzanian side. Furthermore the British 
maps used while ruling both countries were ambiguous. Even today, maps are not 
reliable; some of them designate the boundary at the Eastern side of Lake Nyasa while 
others designate it at the lakes’ midline as depicted in the 1937 map shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of British East Africa (Railways, Towns and Products) (From: Probert 
Encyclopedia)  
Since 1967, the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania has remained 
unresolved, critically impairing the livelihood and basic needs of the Tanzanian citizens 
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living along the lake’s shores. The border dispute is further aggravated by a scarcity of 
resources in that area amidst rapid population growth. By contrast, Lake Victoria in the 
North and Lake Tanganyika in the West of Tanzania are shared by respective 
neighboring countries. In addition, the problem between Malawi and Mozambique over 
the boundary in Lake Nyasa was resolved in November 1954 by an agreement endorsed 
by Britain and Portugal.22 The boundaries along the lakes in the Great Lakes Region of 




Figure 2.   Tanzania Boundary With Neighboring Countries. (From: Airlineamb.org) 
Malawi claims the boundary line should pass along the Eastern border (as shown 
in Figure 2), while Tanzania insists it should pass along the median line as depicted in 
Figure 1 similar to the international boundary between Malawi and Mozambique as 
indicated in both maps. According to Ewan Anderson, “The entire section of the 
                                                 
22 Mayall, “The Malawi-Tanzania Boundary Dispute.” 
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boundary along the shoreline of Lake Nyasa is under dispute. Tanzania claims that, from 
the mouth of River Songwe, the boundary should follow the lake’s median line to a tri-
point with Mozambique which should be on the median line.”23 Tanzania maintains three 
riparian states, Malawi, Mozambique and itself, should share the lake. On the other hand, 
Malawi claims the whole body of water, except a certain part of the lake falls to 
Mozambique. The name of the lake is also not clear-cut; Malawi alleges the lake is “Lake 
Malawi,” while Tanzania and the main stream internationally made maps refer to the 
historic name, “Lake Nyasa.”24 
In the present day, resources from the lake constitute the livelihood for the 
inhabitants dwelling in the background; however, they are thinning at an alarming rate. 
Furthermore, the problem is exacerbated by high population growth and the destruction 
of water catchments in the surrounding highlands, which decreases water levels in the 
lake. Additionally, overfishing, sediment loading, and several other climatic changes 
have multiplied the problem.25 Unquestionably, this situation creates instability in the 
region. This security threat needs to be addressed for the mutual benefits of both Malawi 
and Tanzania.  
One can argue that poor political leadership deprives people of their means of 
livelihood, their constitutional rights, and hence their liberty, the essence of life itself. 
Preservation of citizen life is a noble duty vested in country’s administration. Therefore, 
leadership commitment and political will should aim to resolve political problems, 
including border disputes. The claim that colonialism is the root cause for conflicts in 
Africa, which resulted in underdevelopment, is no longer an acceptable. Now, more than 
ever, it is paramount for African leaders to eschew such thoughts and accept 
responsibility for the continent’s sustainable development. Leadership should possess a 
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vision, maintain a personal connection with it, and address concerns adequately and 
aptly. Growth requires an in-depth capacity to analyze issues and make resourceful 
decisions, devise means to resolutely implement the vision, and make a serious 
commitment to the cause of Africa’s development. Good leadership entails an 
unflinching commitment to empower the people to ensure their livelihood. This will 
confirm legitimacy and establish allegiance to authority, create a firm foundation for 
harmony and stability, and spur a continuous growth. Simultaneously, governments 
should devise feasible developmental plans coupled with aggressive financial systems 
that will enable countries to compete in the global market. 
Boundary conflicts are not limited to Africa; they span the whole world and pose 
a real threat. To appreciate the intensity of global boundary disputes consider the 
following: only 60 states out of 194 nations and 71 auxiliary states are free of border 
disputes.26 Furthermore, a great number among of those 60 countries are islands. Even 
they are not all completely free of minor boundary skirmishes within their territorial or 
international waters. Blanchard claims that boundary wrangles constitutes the majority of 
problems that escalates into feud.27 The issue requires sober efforts to address security 
problems linked with border instabilities.  
B. GLOBAL BORDER CONFLICT RESOLVE IN DEMOCRACIES 
In 2002, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) declared in a report 
that democracy is a prerequisite for human development, “Countries can promote human 
development for all only when they have governance systems that are fully accountable 
to all people-and when all people can participate in the debates and decisions that shape 
their lives.”28 Scholars connect democracy to ancient Greece; it’s meaning is simply ‘rule 
by the people’. However, today, the democratic system is largely an ideal. Leaders in a 
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democracy have the wisdom, courage, and capacity to choose and implement what 
adequately serves the common good. Consequently, citizens have the strength, skills, and 
honor to respond rightfully and dynamically; both sides mutually furnish the foundation 
for growth. Liberal democracy has been a model of success in Europe and North 
America. As a result, it is resolutely claimed that, ‘Western Democracy,’ has created a 
firm foundation for stability and security, which in turn formed an enabling environment 
for development in the West. Leadership and political will make the difference. 
Governments worldwide have endeavored to attain political stability and 
economic prosperity for their people in a multitude of ways. However, challenges related 
to border disputes compound their problems and the ensuing instability puzzle requires 
multiple equations for its solution. Nyerere observed in his ‘Stability and Change in 
Africa Speech,’ given to the University of Toronto, Canada on October 2, 1969, “If a 
door is shut, attempts should be made to open it; if it is ajar, it should be pushed until it is 
wide open. In neither case should the door be blown up at the expense of those inside.”29 
This underpins the importance of cooperation for the development of human societies. 
Huntington observed, “The most important political distinction among countries concerns 
not their form of government, but their degree of government.”30  
Political stability, which flourishes in the West, is a result of democratic 
principles preserved in pertinent constitutions, which enabled preemption of radical and 
rebellious inclinations in society and ultimately debilitated individual whims that may 
arise and cause socio-political dissension. Citizens use the ballot box and the judiciary 
system to reconcile disputes. Freedom of speech and relations among individuals and the 
whole multitude is highly if not fully enjoyed. There is ample room for movement, which 
enables continuous cooperation in all realms of life including political, spiritual, and 
philosophical. What's more, a system exists to ensure that the executive, legislative, and 
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the judiciary branches are evenhanded to perform their respective duties rightfully.31 In a 
democracy, leadership resourcefully bears the heavy responsibility of serving people, and 
they are proud to do so, as illustrated below: 
Democracy is this: democracy is that the men of the government are no 
longer the masters of the people. They are the servants of the people. What 
make a man a master of another man? It is that he pays for him for his 
work. Who pays the men in the government? The people do, for they pay 
the taxes out of which they are paid.32 
On the one hand, keen administrators are compelled to listen intuitively, and to 
respond prolifically and adequately to make their citizens’ life affordable. As argued by 
Locke, “Government exists to protect individuals’ liberty and security, and that its 
legitimacy rests upon the consent of these individuals. Such a government rests upon this 
contract with individuals, and this contract specifies the appropriate relationship between 
citizens and political institutions.”33 This relationship should also be nurtured and 
maintained on a continuous basis to ensure enduring progress. 
On the other hand, citizens have a contractual obligation to play to ensure a 
cooperative environment and maintain stability and security in a nation. Tocqueville 
states, “Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men 
have, in our time, carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the 
object of their common desires and have applied this new science to the greatest number 
of purposes. Is this the result of accident, or is there in reality any necessary connection 
between the principle of association and that of equality?”34 Undeniably, simple 
objectives are not achieved by chance, and chance cannot shape a national destiny; rather 
nations realize their mutual needs by formulating applicable policies for subsequent 
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implementation through well-devised strategies. Citizens must respond conscientiously in 
lieu of the dispensation of liberty bestowed upon them. They mutually invest in stability 
and security as the prerequisite for sound internal and external development.  
After the Cold War, the United States and the European Union (EU), via 
Transatlantic Security Relations, have dealt with security problems on two main levels: 
the global-strategic and domestic security. Internationally, the U.S. has taken the lead in 
the Global War on Terror. On the domestic front, the West has relative stability, because 
it has a solid democratic foundation characterized by democratic maturity. Indeed 
democracies seldom resort to military confrontations against each other and even practice 
restraint from making the first move towards on non-democratic states in the areas of 
border disagreement.35 North America and European countries are free of border 
conflicts. Appropriate border management policies enable amicable coexistence. 
Therefore, the EU is a stable alliance and has no active border disputes. Moreover, 22 EU 
member States have agreed to free migration and the coordination of border management 
by endorsing the Schengen Agreement or “acquis” of 1985 and 1990. This was enacted 
into law in the Treaty of Amsterdam on May 01, 1999 and subsequent member states 
approved the accord.36 A commission is working on the autonomy of Denmark over 
Hans Island and the Kennedy Channel between Ellesmere Island and Greenland, as set in 
Article 76 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.37 Canada and the 
U.S. established a commission to manage the 5,525 miles of boundary traversing the 
Americas from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. The commission administers 
legal aspects and law enforcement for all activities ongoing along the boundary.38 The 
U.S. and Canada are also working tirelessly on the boundary inquiry around Northwest  
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Passage and legal utilization of the waters across the international border. Regarding the 
U.S. border with Mexico, both countries assented to an accord to manage the Rio Grande 
and Colorado River on April 18, 1972.39  
C. THE AFRICAN ENVIRONMENT 
Instability in Africa is commonplace. Fortunately, contemporary trends show that 
armed conflicts are diminishing and recent observations illustrate further improvement in 
the last five years.40 However, Dare’s 2001 observations about an Africa beleaguered by 
authoritarian rulers, nonprogressive governments, and tenuous financial systems still ring 
true. Governments are still failing to maintain social and political structure: 
African unemployment rates are at crisis levels, with over 65% of college 
graduates out of jobs. Because manufacturing is at low ebb, unskilled 
workers suffer a similar fate. Wages are also low. According to the United 
Nations Development Report, the average unskilled worker earns about 55 
cents daily, while the average white-collar employee brings home a 
monthly check of between $50 and $120. Many African societies are 
characterized by minimal opportunities for education and self-
development, collapsed infrastructure, and a debilitating debt burden.41   
Regarding conflicts in Africa, Cleveland claims that, “Despite being one of the 
richest regions, in terms of human and natural resources, extreme poverty and hunger 
abound on the continent.”42 Furthermore, a snapshot of Africa reveals deforestation, fast 
expansion of the Sahara Desert towards the South, small arms proliferation, and cross-
border crimes. In addition to these problems, there exists a debilitating growth factor of 
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diseases, especially Malaria and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).  If 
Africa is endowed with abundant human resources, categorically the basis for human 
economic growth, what is lacking and holding back its development?  
In his memoir about Africa, Godwin notes the dismal state of affairs in the 
continent and claims the trend of Africa’s conflict development is inexcusable: 
Africa unfolds like a geography of doom. Sierra Leone, where hacking off 
of limbs was standard practice; Liberia, where peacekeeping Bangladeshis 
in blue helmets were struggling to separate teenage gunmen wearing 
women’s clothing; Ivory Coast divided between bitter ethnic rivals; 
Congo, where evil wars still raged in a nation that has cased to be and 
probably never was; Sudan, where a civil war still rages and triggers 
frequent spasms of famine; Somalia, which has no government at all now, 
a country that deserves the description anarchic. And, of course, 
everywhere AIDS.43 
The standoff in Ivory Coast following the November 28, 2010 presidential 
elections still rages on and the country is now on the brink of internal war.44 The 
situation is additionally aggravated by conflicts emanating from artificial borders. Of the 
thirty-three countries worldwide considered at high risk for instability, twenty are 
African. The state fragility index of 2008 indicates that almost 80 percent of the African 
continent falls within the serious to extreme band of the directory.45 Independence for the 
African states was necessary and it is precious. It was an indispensable step in breaking 
the colonial yoke and establishing a solid foundation for human freedom and dignity. 
However, the drift towards social and political instability indicates poor governance. Was 
sovereignty a predecessor to strife? Does Africa desire to be left out of the world 
development loop? 
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While reporting on the Bakassi border dispute resolution, Somerville pinned the 
colonial legacy to clashes related to boundaries in Africa.46 Adebajo and Landsberg 
support this school of thought, arguing that imperial administrators drew boundaries in 
the continent without ethnic perspective. They cited conflicts in Sudan, where Arab-
Muslim inhabits the North and a mixture of Blacks Christians and Animists inhabit the 
South. They also point to Rwanda, where Tutsis and Hutus are always fighting, and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which is home to a number of different ethnic 
groups. They concluded, “Borders in Africa are in many cases artificial.” They may 
ferment domestic discords among tribes in a country, break up states, and generate 
intrastate, transnational, and international divergences.47  
The above assertion may be true, but it is not sufficient to explain the persistence 
of border disputes in Africa. For five decades, more than a generation, African 
governments have failed to devise sound policies to build a system of governance capable 
of solving its problems. After the end of colonialism, they should have established 
essential institutions to address development challenges. Instead they fostered continued 
conflicts. According to Diamond, some governments know the possible costs associated 
with bad decisions, but do not take the necessary remedial measures for several reasons, 
including, “ignorance, idleness, reasoning by false analogy, distant managers, and 
creeping normalcy or landscape amnesia.”48 It is invaluable to focus on Gerzon’s 
suggestions about the importance of leading through conflict situations. He argues that, 
all leaders, on the individual, organizational, and national levels, lead in conflict. 
Therefore, it is necessary to have tools to enable efficient and successful leadership. The 
five of Gerzon’s eight tools that are most significant to resolve border conflicts include, 
‘integral vision, presence, conscious conversion, dialogue, and bridging.’49 Perhaps more 
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importantly is the need to avoid Shore’s seven ‘cognition traps’ (Exposure Anxiety, 
Cause fusion, Flat View, Cure-Allism, Infomania, Mirror Imaging, and Static Cling).50 
Shore argues that the seven cognitive traps distract clever people and lead them to make 
bad decisions.  This problem cuts across nations and leaders in both developed and 
developing countries should seriously consider it. Gerzon’s eight tools and Shore’s seven 
cognitive traps are important for understanding both the ongoing border dispute in Africa 
and specifically the dispute between Malawi and Tanzania.  
After independence, some African leaders greatly contributed significantly to the 
ongoing conflicts in the region. Many asserted single party systems would create unity 
and stability; however, partiality and corruption within the ruling elite intensified in due 
course. As a result, “The state became a cash cow to be milked for political patronage. 
Urban bias in development policies further created an aggrieved countryside full of a 
ready army of unemployed youth who have today become the cannon fodder of Africa’s 
warlords.”51 Likewise, windows for dictatorial rules, multiple mutinies, and eventually 
failed states were opened making the situation troublesome and incomprehensible. In 
fact, since the self-rule era in Africa began, there have been scores of attempted revolts, 
and 80 successful armed coup d'état. As a result there are states like the DRC, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Cote d’Ivoire, and Liberia, which are all recent hot spots and 
deteriorating nations.52  The Carter Center has been spearheading the development of 
democracy in Africa, but the situation is not simple, “No handful of facile formulas can 
overcome Africa’s travail. No single observer is likely to have sufficient breath of 
perspective or vision to propound a definitive charter for future resurrection.”53 
It is manifest that, contrary to democratic principles, corruption has blinded elites. 
Rabasa asserts that bureaucrat distortion in developing countries (including Africa) is 
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intense, “This kind of corruption is commonplace in the developing world. It diverts 
public funds for private use, perverts due process to undermine the law, protects officials 
and their cronies from prosecution, and otherwise destroys the effective functioning of 
institutions of government for the public good.”54 The political environment in African 
countries has become a breeding ground for strife and dissent. Citizens in Africa, 
particularly south of the Sahara, are become desolate. They suffer from poverty, fear, 
unquestionable authority, the abuse of power, and misappropriation of public funds. 
Poverty exacerbates hostility and distortion; it also undermines the social-economic 
foundation of stability.55 In such a precarious situation, people become despondent as 
they find themselves captive in their own homes. Consequently, insecurity and instability 
proliferate in the continent. The implementation of democracy is a learning process; 
Nyerere noticed the importance of democracy to Tanganyika at independence: 
Having come into contact with civilization, which has over-emphasized 
the freedom of the individual, we are in fact faced with one of the big 
problems of Africa in the modern world. Our problem is just this: how to 
get the benefit of European society-- the benefits that have been brought 
about by an organization based upon the individual-- and yet retain 
African’s own structure of society in which the individual is a member of 
a kind of fellowship.56  
Nyerere was convinced that there was no better alternative to a democratic 
society. However, he needed to lay a sound foundation prior to devising and 
implementing a contemporary social-economic structure. Politically, he was not a 
Marxist, but a socialist. He believed in using authority for socio-political revolution 
rather than for imposition of power. Nyerere was a servant of the people and truthful 
leader: 
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He is not just a servant of his people. He has always been a leader with 
strong convictions about his peoples needs. Nyerere has been above all a 
teacher, a mwalimu. He is a teacher of a special sort. He is a teacher of 
morality. However, Nyerere is not just a mwalimu. He is a mwalimu-in-
power-a moral teacher who is also a political leader with a great deal of 
authority and power.57  
Nyerere’s viewed democracy as essential feature of the transition to socialism, 
and he said, “The people must make the decisions about their own future through 
democratic procedure. Leadership cannot replace democracy; it must be part of 
democracy.”58  Similarly, when asked by his critics if democracy threatened socialist 
ideals, Nyerere responded: 
I know that there are, even in Tanzania, some beliefs that periodic 
elections are dangerous. It is said that they give to the enemies of our 
people and of our political system an opportunity to sow confusion: it is 
sad they could be used to destroy our unity; that they could be used to get 
rid of good leaders and replace them with bad leaders… I myself am 
aware that periodic elections do bring these dangers. Yet I am quite unable 
to see what we can put in their place.59 
Nyerere could not be swayed from democratic principles. However, in many 
African countries, political transitions are associated with rigged elections, intimidation, 
rejection of election outcomes, and the refusal to relinquish power according to 
constitutions. The world saw what transpired in Kenya60 and in Zimbabwe, “Mugabe has 
three options: admitting defeat, staging a military takeover, or rigging the results.”61 His 
choice is known. Others have distorted respective constitutions to remain in power 
without limits. Currently the world observes the political standoff in Cote-d’Ivoire, where 
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the sitting president, Laurent Gbagbo, refuses to hand over office to Alassane Quattara, 
despite confirmation Quattara winning the November 28, 2010 presidential election.62  
Nyerere also had to address a multi-ethnic and tribal society. In a country with 
more than 120 tribes, each with its own dialect and chiefdom, Nyerere’s quest to build 
national unity and stability was very challenging. As Huntington observed: 
Africa was saddled with an irrational political map upon decolonization, 
one that corresponded to neither geography or ethnicity, nor economic 
functionality. The international system supported that region’s leader’s 
decision to retain those boundaries even as decreasing transportation and 
communications costs made those boundaries more porous and the 
political units more susceptible to mutual destabilization.63  
After independence, Nyerere had to address the fundamental threat of instability 
and underpin security, a prerequisite for growth. Consequently, he abolished chiefdom, 
perceiving it as one of the major sources of instability. Simultaneously, he introduced 
Kiswahili, the national language and made it a government policy to post public officials 
away from their home areas. Furthermore, in a society with multiple beliefs, he 
constitutionally separated religion from state affairs. He maintained that the government 
did not need a single religion, but rather each individual citizen was free to worship his 
choice of religion while abiding with the law. In addition, Nyerere was cognizant of the 
land sensitivity; he made land a state property.  Individuals could lease the land for a 
maximum of 99 years, subject to renewal, and the president had constitutional rights to 
revoke the lease for development purposes. Boarding schools became another platform 
for integration as students were mixed from various regions. Likewise, Nyerere 
introduced a compulsory one-year term of national service for all who attained higher 
education to enable interaction and eventually break tribal barriers and ethnic ideologies. 
From an African perspective, where the society is composed of several tribes with  
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different norms and beliefs, this seemed an appropriate strategy for Tanzania to employ 
to prevent what happened in neighboring countries specifically Burundi, DRC, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. 
Nyerere also declared war against ignorance, disease, and poverty. Regarding 
ignorance and diseases, he noted: 
More than 80 years of colonial rule had left the country with little social 
development. The country then had approximately 200 tarmac road, and 
its “industrial sector” consisted only six factories-including one which 
employed 50 persons. About 85% of adults were illiterate in any language. 
The country for had only 2 African Engineers, 12 Doctors, and perhaps 30 
Arts graduates.64  
He argued that ignorance and destitution were the nemesis of governance. With such a 
foundation, control becomes more precarious and prone to the political instability 
prevalent in Africa. Nyerere further noted: 
But to say this is very different from saying that because Africa is poor, 
Africans do not deserve good governance. This continent is not 
distinguished for its good governance of the peoples of Africa. But 
without good governance, we cannot eradicate poverty; for no corrupt 
government is interested in the eradication of poverty; on the contrary, and 
as we have seen in many parts of Africa and elsewhere, widespread 
corruption in high places breed poverty.65 
So, what happened? The people called Nyerere “Baba wa Taifa,” (Father of the 
Tanzanian Nation), and peacefully handed power to his successor President Ali Hassan 
Mwinyi in 1985. Soon after, he retired from active politics to his home village of 
Butiama in the Musoma region and lived a simple rural life. Nyerere was a good teacher 
and a loving father for both Tanzanians and refugees from neighboring countries. He died  
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on October 14, 1999 at the age of 77. Based on his service to both the country and 
humanity, the Catholic Diocese of Musoma opened a cause for Nyerere to be elevated to 
sainthood. On his death, Wolfensohn commented:  
For the men and women who have served the great cause of development 
in the world, one of the lights of our lives went out today. Mr. Julius 
Nyerere was one of the founding fathers of modern Africa. He was also 
one of the few world leaders whose high ideals, moral integrity, and 
personal modesty inspired people right around the globe. While world 
economists were debating the importance of capital output ratios, 
President Nyerere was saying that nothing was more important for people 
than being able to read and write and have access to clean water.66 
Not surprisingly, in October 2009, the United Nations General Assembly named 
Nyerere World Hero of Social Justice.67 On the subject of governance, Nyerere, once 
said, “Good or bad, the first generation of our leaders is fast being replaced by the second 
or even the third; most of these are better-educated, relatively free from the mental hang-
over of colonialism, and have had the opportunity to learn from the mistakes and the 
successes of their predecessors. With the help of work done at different fora, I am 
confident that African States, individually and in cooperation with one another, can step 
by step and in an ordered fashion, move towards Good Governance.”68 
Contrary to Nyereres’ outlook, Africa, particularly south of the Sahara, is still in 
social and political turmoil. Shah argues: 
There have been over 9 million refugees and internally displaced people 
from conflicts in Africa. Hundreds and thousands of people have been 
slaughtered from a number of conflicts and civil wars. If this scale of 
destruction and fighting was in Europe, then people would be calling it 
World War III with the entire world rushing to report, provide aid, mediate 
and otherwise try to diffuse the situation.69 
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He asserts that among the problems that blight Africa, dishonest leadership and 
poor governance are front and center, and colonialism is only a secondary cause. African 
boundaries did not follow the continent’s anthropological and geographical setting. As a 
result, the unauthentic and often unclear national boundaries created still unsettled 
cultural and ethnic divides. The public sometimes takes the discussion further and 
references the antecedent effects of colonialism associated with slavery and the de-
culturing of African inhabitants during colonial rule. However, it is important to 
underscore that slavery has been in Africa from time immemorial. History shows that 
colonialism is not a strange experience in Africa or in other parts of the world. It has 
existed in Europe and the Middle East as well; Judea, the whole of North Africa, and a 
large part of Europe were once under the yoke of the Roman Empire.70 Arguably, 
colonialism changed the African social structure, and its brief stay did not permit the 
construction of a new structure to go along with the world’s modern development. Some 
may only consider the negative effects in Africa; however, perhaps it is possible to 
perceive colonialism as positive, because it introduced Africa to the contemporary world.   
Border disputes are a legacy of poor governance. Mandel used statistical methods 
on 66 cases from 1945 to 1974 to confirm that the high rate of boundary disagreements 
that escalates to war usually involve only two neighboring countries, both of are 
underdeveloped, have parity in military strength, compete over clannish matters rather 
than resources, and belong to different alliances.71 According to Holsti, the above mirrors 
weak states and emphasizes that future wars will concentrate within particular settings. 
He argues that the phenomenon is a result of organizational weaknesses created by rulers 
as well as colonial inheritance and other facets pertaining to global financial 
arrangements. Subsequently, he classifies the globe into “zones of war, no-war zones and 
zones of peace,” Africa is located in the first sector.72 Additionally, when addressing 
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insecurity Fukuyama asserts, “weak and failing states have arguably become the single 
most important problem for international order.”73 Patrick defines weak and failing states 
as those countries that are very pathetic in governance and fall short in providing 
“physical security, legitimate political institutions, economic management, and social 
welfare-in effect, they posses legal but not empirical sovereignty.”74  Insecurity and 
instability are an inherent part of such drawbacks, characterized by budget deficits 
requiring external support to bridge the gap and provide the aforementioned political 
goods.  
Scholars ponder the issue of failed states in three dimensions. A number of 
researchers agree it is a problem of insecurity. Thus, leaders should aggressively seek and 
implement a way to visualize and find the underlying cause of the predicament. Others 
are doubtful about the foundation, scope, significance, and validity of the botched 
country thesis. They argue that it is not easy to impartially describe, categorize and 
examine the issue decisively. The third group of analysts discards these thoughts as a 
domineering undertone introduced in the international political arena by nations 
convinced of own cultural superiority and desirous of controlling others. Newman states: 
In terms of how international order and threats to security are perceived 
and constructed - which is not necessarily the same as reality-failed states, 
in conjunction with the apparent decline of traditional inter-state threats, 
do represent a fundamental challenge to conventional thinking. This is 
emblematic of a transition to a post-Westphalian world, at least for certain 
audiences.75  
First, the subject of border dispute is challenging and symbolic. It requires a 
divergent study and unique analysis to arrive at pragmatic recommendations. Not 
surprisingly, the study demonstrates a very strong correlation between failed/weak states 
and those experiencing boundary disputes. Indeed, twenty-two of forty failed states and 
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twenty nine of forty weak states in the world respectively are from Africa. Furthermore, 
thirty of forty fragile countries are from Africa, and twenty-nine of the thirty fragile states 
are involved in boundary disputes dilemma.76 Additionally, the CIA Factbook indicates 
the following six African States are free of border disputes: Cape Verde, Lesotho, Mali, 
Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Tunisia. Irrefutably, African. conflict 
environment is distressing; arguably, the quality of its leaders matters. Therefore, it is an 
indispensable duty for Africans to solve the quandary and break the vicious cycle. The 
matter boils down to governance and the role of leadership. Without a doubt, governance 
is critical for solving Africa’s border disputes and security problems. After several 
generations, linking colonialism to ongoing conflicts is no longer acceptable.  
D. THE MALAWI—TANZANIA BORDER CHALLENGE 
Addressing delegates at ‘The First Summit of the International Conference on the 
Great Lakes Region,’ the Tanzanian President, Benjamin W. Mkapa, said that the setting 
in Africa has improved, and the continent was going through a positive transformation, 
though security was still delicate. Instability is still a threat to peace in the region; 
therefore, he urged leaders to take responsibility and establish a road map towards 
improving stability. Mkapa reiterated that, “We must now come to terms with the reality 
that, after an average of 40 years of independence, we cannot keep on blaming colonial 
powers for all our woes. We are independent now, and it is our duty as leaders to rectify 
the negative legacies of colonialism.”77 
Indeed, border disputes still pose a real security threat in the region. Burundi and 
Rwanda quarrel over sections of border along the Akanyaru/Kanyaru and 
Kagera/Nyabarongo Rivers. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda dispute 
Rukwanzi Island in Lake Albert and other areas of Semliki River.78 Kenya and Uganda 
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wrangle about Migingo Island in Lake Victoria.79 Tanzania and Mozambique observe the 
1936-37 agreement between Britain and Portugal along the Ruvuma River. It stipulates 
that, “The boundary should go along the Thalweg in the places where are no islands; and 
in case of disagreement consultation should be made with the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (CIJ).”80 Another disputed border is the Songwe River that forms 
the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania and shifts from one country to another due 
to flooding during the rainy season.81 Malawi and Zambia have been arguing about their 
600-kilometer border for decades. In May 2005, the two countries met to discuss the 
issue, and today the subject is still unresolved.82 
While the above situations are all serious dilemmas, Tanzanian has no 
disagreement with Kenya and Uganda. The three neighboring countries harmoniously 
share Lake Victoria.83 However, in 1978 the Ugandan Dictator Idi Amin claimed the 
Kagera Salient West of Lake Nyanza as part of Uganda.84 The dictator invaded Tanzania 
in October 1978, and Tanzania waged war with Uganda from October 9, 1978 to June 3, 
1979. This war cost Tanzania 373 soldiers, 1,500 civilians, and considerable financial 
loss and associated collateral damages.85 The western boundary with the DRC, Burundi 
and Rwanda has been stable in this regard, while the southern border with Mozambique, 
Malawi and Zambia has remained insecure, especially the border with Malawi.  
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Kaikobad strongly argues that, territoriality stands at the very heart of statehood; 
therefore, any least indication of encroachment or harm to a county’s geographical area 
and privileges is painstakingly analyzed and such actions are fended off at all costs.86 
The sovereignty of a territory is a nation’s most treasured identity and is equally defended 
as well. Consequently, Malawi’s claim over the whole body of Lake Nyasa is the basis 
for tension between Malawi and Tanzania and may subsequently lead to undesired 
confrontations. The stance is deleterious for both countries, and their respective national 
interests are at stake. The International Boundary Study No. 37 also recognizes the 
drawbacks of the Malawi—Tanzania boundary, “Future economic activity in the area 
might require that additional attention be given to the boundary because of problems that 
may start over water rights and transportation needs. Equally, a detailed delimitation of 
the shore boundary of Lake Nyasa might be necessary because of the large fluctuations of 
the water levels of the lake.”87 Yet, the International Law recognizes, “The sovereignty 
of a state extends to its recognized land boundaries and to the border of air space above 
them. Sovereignty over bodies of water is regulated by four separate 1958 
conventions.”88 These conventions call for a bilateral treaty to safeguard the riparian 
rights for neighboring countries. 
Regarding lakes, Emerson articulates a number of privileges and regulations for 
landowner: 
rights to fish, to harvest ice, to build docks, to anchor booms, to build 
mills, to land boats and various others. Moreover, the riparian proprietor 
owns the bed and the right of the water resting thereon and should the lake 
lie between two states or nations the boundary line between them would 
be the centre line of the lake, and each would have title to such centre 
line.89 
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Furthermore, Strong states, “Rights associated with water that is not flowing are 
called littoral. Generally land beneath non-sovereign lakes are owned by the surrounding 
upland owners.  When all the deeds call to the lake, each owner has title to a centre 
point.”90 In addition, riparian proprietors should jointly address problems such as 
sediment loading and loss of biodiversity. Failure to understand all of this has resulted in 
the failure to manage Lake Nyassa’s resources and the deprivation of rights for both 
Malawian and Tanzanian citizens residing along lake. 
Julius Nyerere, the first Tanganyika Prime Minister recognized the riparian rights 
of the country and prepared a policy document for implementation after independence. 
The Secretary—General of the United Nations was informed: 
As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the United Kingdom on 
behalf of the territory of Tanganyika, or validly applied or extended by the 
former to the territory latter, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to 
continue to apply within the territory, on a basis of reciprocity, the terms 
of all such treaties for a period of 2 years from the date of independence 
[i.e. until 8 December 1963] unless abrogated or modified by mutual 
consent. At the expiry of that period, the government of Tanganyika will 
regard such of these treaties, which could not by the application of the 
customary international law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having 
terminated.91 
As a result, Tanzania did recognize the ambiguous treaties when Malawi attained 
its independence on 7 July 1964.  
E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BORDER DISPUTE BETWEEN 
MALAWI AND TANZANIA 
Three countries, Malawi, Mozambique, and Tanzania share Lake Nyasa and its 
natural resources, yet those assets are dwindling at an alarming rate. A study by Nindi on 
management and the level of quality of life of peoples residing in the locale confirmed 
the negative trend as depicted below.92  
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Table 1.   Changing Water Levels in Lake Nyasa and Land Use Changes in the Mount 
Livingstone Catchment Area (%) (From: Nindi, 2007). 
Periods    Deep   Shallow    Grassland/ Cultivated 
water  water           Forest    Shrubs    scattered fields 
      (Lake Nyasa)      (Lake Nyasa)          trees 
 
1884  41.13  2.83  16.96 11.47      13.82   3.15 
1994  23.54  20.39  9.84 16.63      14.31   4.31 
2000  24.09  20.11  8.16 14.92      15.29   6.73 
 
 
Declining fish levels have compelled natives to consume inferior types of fish. 
Moreover, to catch sufficient fish, natives resort to bad or unlawful fishing practices and 
use prohibited fishing nets. In addition, farming practices around the lake significantly 
affect water catchment areas and the lake’s ecosystem. These problems increase the 
chance of clashes over resources in the future.93 Klare describes wars over resources: 
Many key resources or deposits of these materials are shared by two or 
more nations, or lie in contested border areas or offshore economic zones. 
Normally… as these supplies became exhausted governments will 
naturally seek to maximize their access to the contested and offshore 
deposits, thereby producing an increased risk of conflict with neighboring 
states as in the case of many countries in Africa and the Middle East.94 
Crocker confirms that insufficient affluence worsens the plight of weak nations; 
that is, clashes amid states increase with a fast population growth that requires greater 
resources and depletes materials.95  
Payan notes that recently the U.S. and Mexico border situation improved, but still 
lacks two basic ingredients: the political will on both sides to tackle the problem and a 
lack of vision in executive branches to resolve the problem at the border. He argues that 
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the affluence of the two neighboring countries is mutually dependent and failure to 
comprehend this is problematic.96 Spector confirms the above assertions: 
Transboundary issues hold the potential for unleashing interstate conflict 
and regional instability, but if conditions are ripe and the political 
willingness and technological capacity is available, they also offer 
opportunity for conflict prevention or mitigation through cooperative 
mechanism such as negotiation.97 
Axelrod indicates the way forward by illustrating the power of collaboration to 
foster world safety among humankind. He argues that security is the life stream for 
sustainable global development. Security is enabled by a requisite discourse in 
geopolitics and international relations. Furthermore, security can only be achieved 
through capable leadership imbued with the necessary charisma to build strong 
governments coupled with the will to establish sound and binding bilateral and 
multilateral relations between and among nations.98 To reinforce this idea, Ghani and 
Iyer note that clashes hold back local and global development, and their mitigation is the 
only qualification for sustainable growth strategies.99 Consequently, the sooner Malawi 
and Tanzania resolve the impasse over sharing resources the better.  
F CONFLICT RESOLUTION PARADIGM  
1. Leadership Responsibility and Contribution 
Is the current leadership effective in mitigating the border wrangle between 
Malawi and Tanzania? The previous discussion seems to illustrate some weaknesses in 
decision-making and an aversion to act responsibly. Both administrations have not been 
sufficiently effective in resolving the issue; arguably, leadership should take a more 
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proactive stance and devise a plausible and effective strategy to mitigate the dispute. The 
problem of ineffective leadership has prevailed for more than four decades.  
Similarly, the bid to end border disputes by creating a single united African state 
has not progressed. This noble dream of a united Africa has been an objective for African 
leaders since the early 1960s; but it has not materialized: 
For decades the dream of an African continent united under one 
leadership, one government with a prosperous people with shared values, 
interest, and common citizenship and with a common destiny and taking 
their place in the world community of nations has escaped the leadership 
in Africa.100  
Notwithstanding these setbacks, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wade is still 
optimistic about a unified Africa and dared to announce, “The United States of Africa 
will be proclaimed in 2017, to allow for the time needed to work out the different African 
institutions.”101 To deal with its political problems, the continent needs not only capable 
and dedicated leaders, but also intellectual leaders. From the onset, the African Union 
(AU) proposal has never received requisite attention from the majority of its heads of 
state. Indeed, for the same reasons, the celebrated East African Cooperation (EAC) 
collapsed in 1977. An interview with Julius Nyerere revealed:  
Kwame Nkrumah and I were committed to the idea of unity. African 
leaders and heads of state did not take Kwame seriously. However, I did. I 
did not believe in these small little nations. Still today I do not believe in 
them. I tell our people to look at the European Union, at these people who 
ruled us who are now uniting. Kwame and I met in 1963 and discussed 
African Unity.102  
Contrary to Kwame’s thoughts, interstate conflicts and border disputes are still 
commonplace in Africa. While assisting peace negotiation in Burundi in 1999, Nyerere 
was troubled by the increasing violent behavior in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. He 
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felt humiliated after announcing proudly the coming of a united Africa, capable of 
creating a tough and sound economic block in the world and sustaining itself in the 
competitive global market.  
Researches and leaders continue to look for means to deliver Africa from the yoke 
of hopelessness; yet, these changes require strong and creative leadership from willing 
and agile leaders who are ready to work jointly for a sustainable and equitable future.  
Undeniably, stable security is the prerequisite for advancement of nations. However, 
security is a broad topic that encompasses internal and external factors. Therefore, a 
holistic approach to conflict resolution is essential. Leadership and political will are also 
essential to creating security. Collier talks about ‘bad, good, and great leaders,’ 
maintaining that, leadership matters in both, human growth and underdevelopment. He 
asserts that bad leaders “put the failed in failed states.”103 Bad leaders breed instability 
and insecurity. Good leaders bring freedom from tyranny. They practice what they 
preach, showing the way ahead. Great leaders bridge societies from poverty to prosperity; 
they are the gateway to liberty. 
Simply stated, political will is the way forward. There is a call for loyal, 
responsible, dedicated, and humble leaders with human hearts, who will accept the heavy 
responsibilities and challenges of leading nations with confidence and courage. The way 
forward is headship with a strong desire to serve the people, endow creation and 
implement an appropriate system, which will check the government and instill 
responsibility in fellow leaders.  
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2. Political Will 
Political will “is a determination to implement a policy decision (unaccountable 
or accountable) even if it is difficult.”104 Reputedly it is the most powerful tool to bring 
about positive changes in a society. According to Stojanow it is the lifeblood for 
civilizations:  
Political Will is the highest manifestation of the all-inclusive and Omni-
potent willing itself Rational Will; it is the universal power that is in 
everything and there is no social human activity in which Political Will 
does not rule itself through itself. Developing itself continually, it 
develops the ethical and civic virtues as well as the moral values 
and political culture of society in each particular epoch.105   
Authority is another imperative; without it anarchy prevails. The World Bank 
(WB) account on governance for 213 countries from 1996 to 2009 furnishes six 
measurements for good governance as follows, ‘voice and accountability, political 
stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and control of corruption.’106 Most important, political will enables well-articulated 
policies to be the requisite vehicle for socioeconomic advancement. Undeniably, it is an 
instrument for world development and remains the most dominant factor in shaping a 
nation’s destiny. In fact, the UNDP identified four essential factors for achieving the 
‘Millennium Developmental Goals (MDGs)’. Among them are vital characteristic for 
shaping a country’s development, “National ownership: Political will and 
partnership.”107 Again, Charney’s contribution is critical in view of the current world 
developmental. He qualifies, “Political will is the ghost in the machine of politics, the 
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force that generates political action. It can be measured through the polls by measuring 
three factors: opinion plus intensity plus salience.”108 Amicable conflict resolution is 
created from sound policies engendered by governance. Africa has great leaders who can 
harmoniously exploit the great potential of the continent; the key is to boldly accept the 
challenge. 
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III. GAME THEORY IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
It is a doom of men that they fail to see a storm on the horizon when the 
sea is calm. 
Machiavelli, The Prince 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Game theory covers a broad spectrum, and it is valuable tool for solving a variety 
of strategic problems. Borel introduced the subject in 1921. Von Neumann, together with 
Morgenstern, developed the mathematics to solve economics problems.109 Advancement 
in mathematics furthered the theory beyond economics, and today it is used to solve a 
wide range of puzzles in sociology, psychology, politics, and war.110 According to Dixit 
and Nalebuff, “Game Theory is the science of strategic thinking” whereby opponents 
have the choice to disagree and end in conflict or cooperate and emerge with a better 
solution.111 It is an important tool in many types of strategic decision-making, including 
the resolution of border disputes. 
Nyasaland (current day Malawi) became a British protectorate in 1891. In 1964, 
the country gained independence, and President Kamuzu Banda changed the country’s 
name to Malawi.112  He also renamed Lake Nyasa, the root of the dispute between 
Malawi and Tanzania, Lake Malawi and simultaneously claimed the whole lake was 
Malawian. Despite the explosive nature of most border conflicts, this case is relatively 
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quiescent.  There has been no open conflict, but it remains a point of dispute.113 For the 
last 47 years, neither country has made a considerable effort to resolve the problem. On 
the one hand, unfriendly statements by Dr. Banda could have resulted in war. This would 
have been a zero-sum game,114 where one player’s gains are another player’s loss.  
However, a zero-sum solution is neither desirable nor likely given the importance of the 
lake to both countries and the surrounding tribes. For such reasons, open confrontation 
between Malawi and Tanzania is not a good option for resolving the border conflict. 
Tanzanian Members of Parliament have incessantly asked the Tanzanian 
government to resolve the border dispute with Malawi; however, Tanzania’s 
consultations with Malawi have not been successful.115 Recently Tanzanian Prime 
Minister, Mizengo Peter Pinda, attempted to seek African Union (AU) arbitration. This is 
a ‘partial-sum game’ solution, whereby both players can gain something. According to 
the Premier, “For the Government of Tanzania, the question of development is more 
important than a border dispute.”116 Yet border conflicts impact heavily on development, 
which requires cooperation to preserve shared resources, such as the lake and its wildlife. 
Adept leadership with strong political will should readily seek cooperation between the 
two countries. Communication is the prerequisite for dynamic negotiations that should 
lead to cooperation represented by the Nash arbitration.  Lack of cooperation, on the 
other hand, may result in failure. Kaikobad states, “an uncooperative approach would 




                                                 
113 “Government Statistics – Transnational Issues, Disputes, International (most recent) by country,” 
NationMaster.COM, http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/ gov_tra_iss_dis_int-government-transnational-
issues-disputes-international (accessed January 22, 2011). 
114 Shore, Blunder: Why Smart People make Bad Decisions, 83.   
115 Rodgers Luhwago, “MPs Want Lake Nyasa Border Dispute Resolved,” The Guardian, February 
10, 2010, http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=13378  (January 13, 2011); Sosthenes Mwita, 
“Government Clarifies on Tanzania – Malawi Border,” Kilimanjaro Forum, http://www.kforumonline.com/ 
viewtopic.php?t=712&sid=6ff7f94b3f06010d9542913ba89b2ac2 (January 13, 2011). 
116 Levina Kato, “Lake Nyasa Dispute Resolvable,” From the Parliament, Daily News Tanzania, 
February 4, 2010, http://www.dailynews.co.tz/bunge/?n=7245 (accessed January 22, 2011). 
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perceived by litigating States: the dispute will continue to fester and would jeopardize the 
relations between the disputing parties.”117 Hopefully negotiations and cooperation will 
occur before the dispute over the lake flares up. 
B. PARTIAL–CONFLICT GAMES IN BORDFR DISPUTES RESOLUTION 
Player’s preferences are diametrically opposed in total-conflict games; however, 
this is not the case in partial–conflict games. “Games of partial conflict are variable–sum 
games, in which the sum of payoffs to the players at the different outcomes varies.”118 
‘Game Theory’ gives insight into the payoff of cooperation in real life problems. In 
particular, Game Theory can show how Malawi and Tanzania can share Lake Nyasa’s 
resources. Both players anticipate mutual gain, but this requires they cooperate and 
engage in sound communication. The main objective is to attain a peaceful environment 
that will enable growth in the region.  
1. The Game 
The decision made by Malawi and Tanzania about sharing Lake Nyasa’s 
resources is the basis of the game. Currently, Malawi claims the whole body of water, 
while Tanzania wishes to share these resources. Therefore, the strategic options available 
for each country are considered together with the assignments of respective payoffs. The 
game assumes that both countries will cooperate and each desires the best possible 
solution.  The basis for assigning payoffs for each country is influenced by the possible 
strategic options available for each player as shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
                                                 
117 Kaikobad, Interpretations and Revision of International Boundary Decisions, 339. 
118 Consortium for Mathematics and its Application (COMAP), For All Practical Purposes: 
Mathematical Literacy in Today’s World, 6th ed. (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 2003), 561. 
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Table 2.   Options available for Tanzania Ranked From Best To Worst (4 to 1) 
 
 




From Table 3 the resulting game matrix is as follows: 
 
 
Figure 3.   The game:  Tanzania Vs. Malawi 
Tanzania’s Strategic Options 
4 – Best – Tanzania does nothing; Malawi withdraws claim 
3 – Next Best – Tanzania asks mutual gains; Malawi withdraws claim 
2 – Least worst - Tanzania asks mutual gains; Malawi maintains claim 
1 – Worst - Tanzania does nothing; Malawi maintains claim 
 
Malawi’s Strategic Options 
4 – Best – Malawi maintains claim; Tanzania does nothing 
3 – Next Best – Malawi maintains claim; Tanzania asks mutual gains 
2 – Least worst – Malawi withdraw claim; Tanzania asks mutual gains 
1 – Worst – Malawi withdraw claim; Tanzania does nothing 
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Eventually the possible strategic moves are as follows: 
• A: Tanzania does nothing by refraining from a hostile posture that may 
trigger enmity with Malawi. 
• B: Tanzania asks that the boundary between the two countries be located 
at mid-point line in the lake. The riparian states have equal rights to share 
Lake Nyasa’s resources. 
• C: Malawi withdraws the claim to the entirety of the lake. This produces a 
friendly posture that may lead to peaceful settlement of the dispute. 
• D: Malawi maintains the current claim, which is an unfriendly posture that 
may set off hostility. 
2. Noncooperative Solution and Nash Equilibrium 
Once the payoffs for each player have been established, communication between 
the players is not allowed in order to show the effects of self interest moves. Each player 
tries to maximize its payoffs and the results show the effects of poor cooperation between 
















Figure 4.   Movement Diagram: Tanzania Vs. Malawi 
 42 
From the above movement diagram: 
If A then D results in a (1, 4), Malawi chooses to maximize its outcome, and for 
the same reason if B then D, and the result is (2, 3).  
If C then A; results in a (4, 1); Tanzania chooses to maximize its outcome, and for 
the same reason if D then B, and the result is (2, 3). 
The game produces a dominant strategy D for Malawi, while Tanzania is 
disadvantaged. Since players selfishly attempt to maximize their outcomes, via ‘maximin 
theorem,’ the outcome is BD that is (2, 3).119 Additionally, the incoming arrow at BD 
according to Straffin, identifies ‘the equilibrium’ which in a non-zero sum games is 
called the ‘Nash Equilibrium.’120 Since there is no communication, the game ends with 
an outcome of (2, 3); Malawi maintains its claim and tension between the two countries 
continues. This is not the desired solution for both countries, because there is the 
possibility of improving their respective outcomes. 
3. Strategic Moves With Communication 
In this game, communication makes the two countries’ moves known, and 
cooperation is possible. After opening communication between the Malawi government 
and Tanzania government, let us look at first moves. Most likely Tanzania will move 
first, because it wants Malawi to change its policies: 
If Tanzania does A, and Malawi does D, the outcome is (1, 4). If Tanzania does 
B, and Malawi does D, the outcome is (2, 3). Tanzania would choose outcome (2, 3) 
because it is the best one from its perspective. 
But suppose Malawi moves first. If Malawi does C, and Tanzania does A, the 
implied outcome is (4, 1). If Malawi does D, and Tanzania does B, the implied outcome 
is (2, 3). From a Malawi perspective, the choice would definitely be (2, 3). If Tanzania 
moved first, it would result in the outcome of (2, 3); if Malawi moved first it would also 
                                                 
119 COMAP, For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today’s World, 565. 
120 Philip D. Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy (Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of 
America Inc., 1993), 66. 
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result in the outcome of (2, 3). In other words, the first move gives neither player an 
advantage, nor have they improved the outcome as to the earlier likely outcome without 
communication.  
What about threat and promises?121 Looking at threat, Tanzania wants Malawi to 
play C, and issues a threat on D. If Malawi plays D, Tanzania hurts itself by doing what 
is logically wrong by playing A with an outcome of (1, 4). The move does not hurt 
Malawi, so it is not a threat and does not eliminate the desired outcome. In other words, 
Tanzania cannot force Malawi to choose C with threats. Suppose Tanzania offers a 
promise to Malawi, if they play C. If Malawi plays C, Tanzania hurts itself by playing B 
instead of the logical A with an outcome of (3, 2). The promise hurts Tanzania and helps 
Malawi. In addition, the promise will not work on its own, because Malawi can increase 
its utility by playing strategy D. Thus, Tanzania cannot convince Malawi to choose C 
with just a promise. Still, Tanzania is not in a good position; its first move, provoked by 
either threat or promise will not prove successful. This situation may reflect the explosive 
nature embedded in border disputes, exacerbated by the desire to maintain sovereignty. 
Tanzania has not improved its outcomes; Malawi’s standoff and the threat of war prevail. 
The countries have yet to find a way to cooperate and provide for the essential needs of 
the citizens residing along Lake Nyasa. Moreover, the threat posed by environmental 
degradation in this security environment continues. 
4. Prudential Security 
Though communication occurred in the previous game, it is apparent that both 
countries continued to play selfishly.  Neither Tanzania nor Malawi can unilaterally 
depart from their conservative strategy. Also Tanzania’s threats and promises do not 
work to improve outcomes. The way forward is to examine each player’s security level. 
In a non-zero sum game, another name for optimal strategy is the ‘prudential strategy,’ 
and the value of the player’s game is its ‘security level.’122 The case of hostility requires 
the examination of each player’s game. Tanzania will seek to maximize its outcome, 
                                                 
121 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 87–88. 
122 Ibid., 69. 
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while Malawi seeks to minimize it. Malawi will seek to maximize its outcome, while 
Tanzania seeks to minimize it. The results of both moves will determine each player’s 
security, and subsequent analysis will suggest further actions possible by the two 
countries. 
Tanzania’s security level and prudential strategy: Tanzania payoffs-Tanzania 














Figure 5.   Tanzania’s Security Level 
Maximin value equals to minimax value = 2 implies there is a saddle point at BD. 
In a pure strategies game, Tanzania’s security level is 2, and its prudential strategy is B. 
Malawi’s security level and prudential strategy: Malawi’s payoffs-Malawi 















Figure 6.   Malawi’s Security Level 
Maximin equals to minimax = 3 implies there is a saddle point at BD. In a pure 
strategies game, Malawi’s security level is 3, and its prudential strategy is D. Figures 5 
and 6 show that the security levels for Tanzania and Malawi are 2 and 3 respectively. The 
graphical snapshot solution is shown in Figure 7 
 
Figure 7.   The Malawi and Tanzania Ordinal Security Levels Snapshot 
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Analysis reveals that the game is a ‘Zero-sum game;’ therefore, interval scaling 
should be utilized to devise a partial-conflict game. Additionally, the ‘prudential 
strategies’ game shows that Tanzania should always play strategy B, while Malawi 
should always play strategy D, resulting in a (2, 3) outcome. The problem is not resolved 
and a standoff prevails. Tanzania is at a disadvantage and should reconsider its strategies. 
5. Interval Scaling by Utilizing Cardinal Values  
To depict the ongoing game more accurately, cardinal values will replace ordinal 
values. Straffin states, “A scale on which not only the order of numbers, but also the 
ratios of differences of the numbers is meaningful is called an interval scale.”123 The 
game is now based on a 10-point variable, with 10 being the best and 1 being the worst. 
Tanzania’s proposed best cardinal utility is 10, followed by next best 6, least best is 3, 
and worst is 1. For Malawi, the best cardinal utility is 10, next best is 4, least best is 2, 













Figure 8.   The Game With Cardinal Values: Tanzania Vs. Malawi 
                                                 
123 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 50. 
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Strategic moves with cardinal values show similarities in threats; promises and 
players’ payoffs are also consistent with the ordinal payoffs.  The Nash Equilibrium is 
still at BD and the outcome is (3, 4) for Tanzania and Malawi respectively. However, 
further analysis shows that the game has two important facets require more thought. First, 
the threat and promise aspects may lead to two possible solutions.  On the one hand, at 
equilibrium BD, neither Tanzania nor Malawi can unilaterally change its strategy to get a 
better payoff. Each player has two options, defection or cooperation.124 On the other 
hand, both players may use the promises opening available to cooperate until they 
achieve mutual benefits. Axelrod underpins the importance of cooperation, together with 
good communication or trust, in the absence of which uncertainty prevails.125 Second, 
cardinal rather than ordinal values now enable plotting the players’ payoffs polygon and 
thus work out the ‘Nash Arbitration.’ A graphical solution of Malawi and Tanzania 
security levels for the cardinal values is shown in Figure 9. Nevertheless, the border 
dispute problem will not be resolved if Tanzania does nothing and Malawi continues with 
its current stance. This state of affairs has prevailed for about five decades. This indicates 
a refusal to cooperate; therefore, there can be no agreement even if there is 
communication between the players.126 The dispute between the two countries indicates a 
sign of insufficient leadership and political will. This situation calls for the inducement of 
cooperation between Malawi and Tanzania. 
                                                 
124 Sandra H. Savage, Instructors Guide to Accompany: For All Practical Purposes: Introduction to 
Contemporary Mathematics (New York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1991), 140. 
125 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, 3–5.  
126 COMAP, For All Practical Purposes: Mathematical Literacy in Today’s World, 562. 
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Figure 9.   The Malawi and Tanzania Cardinal Security Levels 
Consequently, the importance of leadership and accountability, as well as the 
political will to resolve the border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania, is becoming 
clear. Leaders from both countries should agree to resolve the border dispute to achieve a 
win-win outcome. 
6. Cooperative Solution-Nash Arbitration Scheme 
The most viable solution to border dispute between Malawi and Tanzania is 
cooperation. In other words, formal de-escalation of the border dispute is achievable 
through agreement between the parties. Indeed, the United Nations (UN) Charter 
“stipulates directly or indirectly that changes of inter-state boundaries are accepted only 
 49 
through peaceful means.”127 The next game assumes that the two countries have decided 
to cooperate; they have agreed to meet and negotiate on their own or opt for an unbiased 
intermediary with the intention of improving their respective payoffs. Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944) argued that a pragmatic adjudicated result must be ‘Pareto Optimal’ 
and also must be above the security level for both players to succeed. Therefore, 
according to Pareto, the desired solution ought not to be (3, 4), since it is not Pareto 
optimal (both sides can improve without hurting the other player). They should seek 
better outcomes (along the line of AD-AC, which is the Pareto optimal boundary) that 
will also reflect improved security and stability once the agreement between the two 
countries is implemented.128  
a. Nash Arbitration Graphical Solution 











Figure 10.   Malawi vs. Tanzania: Graphical Solution Payoffs 
The “Status Quo (SQ) point is a pair of payoffs which the players will 
receive if they cannot agree to cooperate.”129 At this point, neither player can improve 
                                                 
127 Kjell-Ake Nordquist, “Chapter 2: Boundary Conflicts and Preventive Diplomacy,” http://www. 
wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/zart/ch2htrm (accessed February 10, 2011). 
128 Straffin, Game Theory and Strategy, 67, 103. 
129 Erin Pearse, “Math 121 – Game Theory Review,” http://math.ou.ed/-epearse/resources/Math121-
Game-Theory/121review.pdf (accessed February 10, 2011). 
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unilaterally; that is, during hostility the players have attacked each other and are trapped 
at the SQ point. In some games, the SQ point and the player’s security level are the same 
as they are in this one. However, the point (3, 4) reflects poor payoffs caused by the 
legacy of selfish moves and lack of cooperation. The respective player payoffs are plotted 
to get the ‘payoff polygon’ as shown in Figure 11, and the Nash Point (NP) is obtained 
through the following steps: 
(1) The SQ is at (3, 4). 
(2) Establish the Nash triangle EF, SQ (BD), and GH. 
(3) Graphically, NP is located along the ‘negotiating set,’ which is a 
dashed line forming part of the ‘Pareto optimal line’ between points EF and GH. The NP 
for this particular game is (5, 6). The result is above the security level obtained by both 
countries. It can be observed from Figure 11 illustrates that Malawi’s outcome has 
improved from 4 to 6, while Tanzania’s has gone from 3 to 5. The result indicates both 
countries can benefit mutually.  
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Figure 11.   The Nash Arbitration Point-Graphical Solution 
Since the game resolution lies on line segment AD—AC, the players 
should play pure strategy options with definite probabilities. The graphical solution 
shows that Malawi should always play 44.44% of strategy C and 55.56% of strategy D, 





Figure 12.   Strategies Played by Malawi Vs. Tanzania 
b. Nash Arbitration Algebraic Solution  
(1) Nash Point Calculation. A formula for numeric calculation 
of the Nash Point is derived from Figure 11 as Nash point [Xo + a/2|m|, Yo + a/2]. Where 
m is the slope of the Pareto optimal line, Xo and Yo are status quo coordinates, which is 
equivalent to security levels of respective players, and a is the height of the Nash triangle 
from point BD (3, 4) to point E: F (3, ..). Calculation of the required parameters should be 
as follows: 
• Equation of the Pareto line connecting coordinates AD (1, 10) and AC (10, 
1) is y = mx + c, where c is the y-intercept. 
• Therefore m = (Y2-Y1)/(X2-X1) = (1-10)/(10-1) = -1 
• Then c = Y1-mX1 = 10-(-1*1) = 11 
• The equation for the Pareto line is y = - x + 11. 
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Next, is the calculation of the height of the Nash triangle, which 
is the intercept of the Pareto optimal line and the Xo (X value of the status quo) minus Yo.  
• Let a equal the height of the Nash triangle and Yi be the y value at the 
intercept with the Pareto optimal line at EF. 
• Therefore, Yi = mXo + c 
• Yi = -1*3 + 11 = 8. Therefore point E:F is (3, 8) and Point G:H equals Xo 
+ 4 = 3 + 4 = 7 
• Since Yi – Yo = a; then a = 8 – 4 = 4 
Finally, the Nash Point is obtained by substituting relevant values 
in the Nash Point equation: Nash Point [Xo + a/2|m|, Yo + a/2]. 
• X Nash = Xo + a/2|m| = 3 + 4/2|-1| = 3 + 2 = 5 
• Y Nash = Yo + b/2 = 4 + 4/2 = 4 + 2 = 6 
• The Nash Point is therefore, (5, 6).  
(2) Algebraic Implementation of the Nash Arbitration. To 
implement the Nash arbitrations, calculation of the relative frequency should also be 
derived from Figure 12 above. In practice, the 'negotiating set' line (the dashed line EF to 
GH) should be measured and the relative frequency calculated by the ratio method. 
However, Feix provides an easier method: “One can calculate the difference on the X-
axis between the Nash Point and the Pure Strategy solutions.” 130 Whereas (referring 
Figure 12): 
• 1 – {|XNash-XAC|/|XAD – XAC|} is the relative frequency of AC … (1). 
• 1 – {|XNash-XAD|/|XAD – XAC|} is the relative frequency of AD ... (2) 
Using the equations (1) and (2) at AC (10, 1) and AD (1, 10) we 
have: 
• 1 – {|5 – 10|/|1 – 10|} = 1 – {|-5|/|-9|} = 1 – 5/9 = .4444 or 44.44% of 
strategy AC and  
• 1 – {|5 - 1|/|1 – 10|} = 1 – {|4|/|-9|} = 1 – 4/9 = .5556 or 55.56 % of 
strategy AD.  
                                                 
130 Feix Miroslav, “Game Theory: Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Student,” (Monterey: 
Naval Postgraduate School Master’s Thesis, June 2007, 48. 
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From Figure 12, the Nash Point suggests that the two countries 
should compromise on the border location, aiming for the boundary line to be located at 
the middle of Lake Nyasa. Therefore, in cooperative play, Malawi should play 44.44% 
strategy C and 55.56% strategy D, while Tanzania plays strategy A all the times. Malawi 
has agreed to withdraw its eastern boundary claim and maintain its legal part of the lake. 
Tanzania maintains strategy A. In a cooperative situation, Tanzania can play strategy A 
only, because strategy B is applicable in selfish and hostile situations. However, one 
should note that the game is difficult, because Malawi has a dominant strategy. If 
Tanzania plays strategy A or B, Malawi will play its dominant strategy D. For that 
reason, there has to be a covenant or a procedure to make certain that the game is played 
in coordination. 
The game shows that enlightened leadership can always opt for 
better choices when seeking security and stability for their countries. Unselfishness and 
confident trust is a hallmark of friendship that fosters bilateral relationships and regional 
integration. Once the two countries make an agreement, Malawi will withdraw its claim 
and mapping procedures may begin. To triumph, Tanzania and Malawi should now 
decide how to play to achieve the arbitrated outcome. Suggestions to review the Malawi-
Tanzania border given in the ‘International Boundary Study No. 37’ can be readily 
implemented.131  Consequently, cooperation creates an enduring foundation for joint 
development projects and a reliable environment for Malawi and Tanzania to provide 
their citizens quality livelihoods; this is the fulfillment of the ‘social contract.’   
                                                 
131 “International Boundary Study No. 37 – October 26, 1964, Malawi – Tanzania (Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar) Boundary (Country Codes: MI – TZ),” Department of State – United States of America. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Through…., and clever maneuvering (strategy/policy), a general can win 
without shedding blood. 
—Sun Tsu, The Art of War  
A. CONCLUSION 
This study has posited that, given prudent and congenial leadership in Malawi and 
Tanzania, a resolution to the border dispute over Lake Nyasa is possible. The border 
dispute has been ongoing for five decades, making it an incessantly potential ‘conflict 
flashpoint’ for three main reasons. First, Malawi’s claim to the entire lake, which goes 
against the internationally recognized border, is perilous for both countries and the region 
at large. Second, tensions still simmer over the violent behavior both countries observed 
during the 1990s and Malawi’s accusation of illegal fishing by Tanzanian fishermen and 
their subsequent ban on fishing in the lake, as depicted in Figure 13.  
 
 
Figure 13.   The Contested Boundary (From: Google Earth Satellite Maps)  
Third, resources from Lake Nyasa, which make up the livelihood for inhabitants 
dwelling in the region, are thinning at an alarming rate. The problem is exacerbated by 
high population growth and the destruction of watersheds in the surrounding highlands, 
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which in turn decreases water levels in the lake. Overfishing, sediment loading, and 
climate changes have intensified the problem. These conditions broaden instability in the 
region and produce a security threat that needs attention for mutual cohabitation between 
Malawi and Tanzania. 
The study has shown that border disputes abound all over the world, and their 
resolution is possible through democratic processes and international arbitration and 
negotiations, rather than through armed conflicts. Democracies (specifically the Western 
Democracies) have managed to minimize adverse consequences associated with border 
disputes. Democracies do not resort to military confrontations against each other. They 
also practice restraint against first moves towards non-democratic states in the areas of 
border disagreement. North America and European countries are free of border conflicts; 
amicable coexistence is enabled by appropriate border management policies. Today the 
EU is a stable alliance and has no active border disputes. The Canadian-U.S. border is 
well managed by both countries and even the porous Mexico-U.S. border is equally 
managed by the April 18, 1972 accord.  
In Africa, instability is commonplace. Border disputes underscore the region’s 
underdevelopment; they are been among the most basic source of bitter struggles. They 
cause relentless strife, including refugee problems, environmental degradation, 
deforestation, small arms proliferation, organized crime, and other regional instabilities. 
Along with these problems, the most debilitating growth factor is diseases, especially 
Malaria and HIV/AIDS. In 2001, Dare observed that undemocratic rulers, non-
progressive governments, and weak financial systems have not improved much. 
Governments are still failing to maintain social and political order, and today new 
flashpoints are developing in countries such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria. Despite 
Africa’s privileged circumstances, in terms of human and natural resources, extreme 
poverty and hunger thrive on the continent. 
This thesis argued that a leadership vacuum and lack of political will are largely 
to blame for holding back Africa’s development. The situation is additionally aggravated 
by conflicts emanating from the artificial borders drawn in Berlin in the 1880s. This is 
also the basis for the border problem between Malawi and Tanzania along Lake Nyasa. 
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The unresolved boundary treaty (referred to as the colonial legacy) between Malawi and 
Tanzania, however, is no longer a cloak for dysfunctional leadership. It is a fact that 
colonialism changed the African social structure, and its brief stay did not permit 
construction of a new structure to go along with modern development and compliment 
these changes. Despite this, Nyerere the Father of the Tanzanian Nation managed to lay 
the foundation for development in Tanzania. Unfortunately, but progress is being held 
back by both internal and external factors. Internally it appears political will is not in 
place to implement his vision. Externally Tanzania is affected by events like the failure of 
the EAC and other regional instabilities, including the border dispute with Malawi. 
Conflicts foster mistrust and impinge heavily on human development in the region. The 
role democracy plays in mitigating border problems is the solution to the Tanzania and 
Malawi border conflict.  
The thesis underpinned the importance of cooperation in nations’ efforts to 
resolve border conflicts. The mathematical tools in the branch of game theory were used 
to propose a plausible solution for the conflict between Malawi and Tanzania. Once the 
will to mutually gain from an antagonistic situation was engendered, teamwork promoted 
progress amidst the rivals. It revealed that cooperation permits communications; as a 
result, the opponents were able to achieve mutual gains through partial sum games. Poor 
payoffs were achieved from selfish strategic moves, specifically from the absence of 
communication between Tanzania and Malawi. Improved payoffs, in turn, were realized 
with better communication and achievements beneficial to all were realized with better 
communication. A reduced conflict situation creates an atmosphere that is conducive for 
enhanced bilateral cooperation and mutual development between the two states.  
The game demonstrated that enlightened leadership can always opt for better 
choices when seeking security and stability for its country. Additionally, unselfishness 
and trust help to foster bilateral relationships and regional integration. Consequently, 
cooperation creates an enduring foundation for joint development projects and a reliable 
environment for Malawi and Tanzania to provide their citizens with quality livelihoods; 
which is the fulfillment of the ‘social contract.’   
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Game theory is only a tool to suggest a way out of Malawi and Tanzania’s 
border dispute. The crux of the matter boils down to strong wills that enable compromise 
and firm decision-making. The ongoing situation along Lake Nyasa, if left unchecked, 
could spiral into war. Yet the border dispute resolution and its implementation are 
impossible without leadership commitment and political will. The best option is a 
congenial agreement between Malawi and Tanzania. Consequently it is recommended: 
• To review the Malawi-Tanzania border as recommended in the 
‘International Boundary Study No. 37.’ Malawi and Tanzania should meet 
to discuss and agree to resolve the border dispute along Lake Nyasa.  
• Both countries should work together to implement the agreement by 
mapping the border according to international regulations governing 
inland waterways and lakes. 
• Each country should undertake measures to control the destruction of 
water catchments around Lake Nyasa specifically deforestation and bad 
farming practices. Population control may also be beneficial to Malawi 
and Tanzania. 
• Malawi and Tanzania should devise a cooperative framework that will 
enable joint projects; specifically hydropower production and fishing. 
Control of bad fishing practices should be paramount. 
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